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We examine the period from 1991 to 2005 to document the effects of a changing Japanese labor 
market on trends in the cost of job change. During this period, job change penalties and the 
extent to which they were age-related grew. Evidence is also found of a diminishing specificity 
in human capital (in industry, occupation and firm size) for job changers in the Japanese labor 
market. As might be expected, older workers and workers leaving the largest firms suffered the 
largest wage losses from job change. Older workers were also harmed more by involuntary job 
separations. In percentage terms, young females have larger wage losses than young males but 
older females have smaller losses than older males. This pattern is masked in considering only 
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1. Introduction 
The Japanese labor market in the 1990s was one of both change and continuity. While the 
prolonged recession in Japan had an impact on measurable aspects of the labor market, including 
rising unemployment, a gradual reduction in training expenditures
1 and shifting employment 
shares across industries, scholars argue that the basic characteristics of the employment system 
did not change.
2 This paper examines one aspect of the effect of the changes in the labor market 
on workers, namely, trends in job displacement penalties. A second question addressed is 
whether evidence can be found for human capital that is firm, industry, occupation or career 
specific and whether trends in these can be identified in light of diminishing training 
expenditures at the firm level.   
  There are reasons to believe changes in job displacement penalties were taking place 
during the period under consideration. A rising level of unemployment presumably increases the 
cost of involuntary job change as continuously employed workers are somewhat shielded from 
conditions in the outside labor market relative to those who must find new employment. This is 
especially true in Japan where internal labor markets are particularly important and pay has been 
traditionally more determined by seniority and individual qualifications than by the market pay 
rate of the job. At the same time, falling job training expenditures should have the opposite effect 
as workers lose less firm specific human capital upon job change. The consequences of the 
changes taking place in the labor market on job displacement penalties in the world’s second 
largest economy have been the subject of very little investigation. 
                                                 
1 Japanese firms reduced training expenditures during the 1990s. The share of training 
expenditures in total labor cost declined from 0.36% in 1991 to 0.28% in 2002. However, the 
average share during 1980s was approximately 0.30%. Therefore, the decline in 1990s might be 
interpreted as the return to previous levels. [Ohki (2003) figure 2, originally from Survey on 
Working Condition, MHLW.] 
2 Rebick [2005] argues that dismissals that occurred during Japan’s post-bubble period economic 
slump did not represent a departure from traditional employment practices. Furthermore, 
employment up to the age of mandatory retirement for regular employees in the primary sector 
(mainly men in full-time employment at medium and large firms) still exists though it never 
characterized the careers of most workers. Kato [2001] also argues against the notion of a 
substantial change in regards to lifetime employment. To cope with the difficult economic 
climate, Rebick cites firm adaptations including an increase in the importance of lower cost non-
standard employment, including part-time and contract work, and more of an individualistic 
approach to human resource management, including performance pay.    2
  A worker’s return to firm tenure, often interpreted as a payment for the accumulation of 
firm specific human capital, has long been observed in wage equations. The results of some 
recent papers call into question whether specific capital accrues from firm tenure, as opposed to 
industry, occupation or career tenure. The increase in the cost of job displacement from industry 
change has been noted in several papers.
3 Neal (1995) argues that previous studies on the returns 
to experience have attributed returns to firm specific capital while overlooking the important 
effects of industry specific capital. Parent (2000) also finds wage profiles are more dependent on 
industry specific human capital than firm specific human capital. More recently, Kambourov and 
Manovskii (2005) note the importance of occupation specific human capital. They find returns to 
occupational tenure to be substantial and, when accounted for, that returns to firm or industry 
tenure are of much less importance. Finally, with data from the Danish labor market, Munch 
(2006) discounts notions of firm, industry or occupational specific capital in favor of the idea 
that the capital workers gain is actually career specific where career change is defined as a 
change in both industry and occupation.  
  We examine the period from 1991 to 2005 to document the effects of a changing labor 
market on the cost of job change and the source of and trends in specific capital. During this 
period, job change penalties and the extent to which they were age related grew. Evidence is also 
found of a diminishing specificity in human capital (in industry, occupation and firm size) for job 
changers in the Japanese labor market occurring around 2000 that perhaps reflected the gradual 
reduction in on the job training expenditures. As might be expected, older workers and workers 
leaving the largest firms suffered the largest wage losses from job change. Older workers were 
also harmed more by involuntary job separations. Young females have larger wage losses than 
young males but older females have smaller losses than older males. This pattern yields little 
overall gender difference in the cost of job change.   
  Numerous studies have investigated job displacement penalties in the US labor market. 
Surveys of this literature were conducted by Hamermesh (1989), Fallick (1996) and Farber 
(1997). Estimates of US job displacement penalties are in the range of 15 to 40% [Topel 1993]. 
Larger penalties are associated with more firm and labor market experience, periods of higher 
unemployment and changing industry upon re-employment. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining 
data, studies of job displacement penalties in the Japanese labor market are quite scarce. Since 
                                                 
3 For instance, see Podgursky and Swaim (1987), Addison and Portugal (1989), and Kletzer (1991).   3
the comprehensive study by Abe, Higuchi, Nakamura, Kuhn and Sweetman [2002], there has 
been no research with nationally representative data to establish how changes taking place in the 
Japanese labor market have affected the wage implications of job change. Abe et al. studied the 
effects of job change on wages that took place in 1995, a period of moderate GDP growth (2.4%) 
and unemployment (3.2%). We examine the survey data from the same source but over the 
period from 1991 through 2005.  
  Wage changes in this survey data are classified into five categories: over 30%, 10% to 
30%, 10% to -10%, -10% to -30% and over -30%. When the following values are assigned to 
workers in each of the these categories, 30%, 15%, 0%, -15% and -30%, the results of Abe et al. 
indicate that, when all sources of job separation both voluntary and involuntary are grouped 
together, on average male and female workers benefited slightly from job change. For both 
genders, the consequence of job change was an increase in income of about 2.2%. The gains of 
young workers were partially offset by the losses of older workers, especially for men.  When 
only involuntary job changes are considered and those transferred temporarily to other 
companies are excluded (the practice of shukko), the average male lost 4.3% and the average 
female gained .3%. The mean loss for men results from the losses of men 45 and over more than 
offsetting the gains of younger men. Nearly 28% of men 45 and over suffered wage losses of 
more than 30%. Abe at al. attribute the large losses for men over 55 to the traditional practice of 
mandatory retirement in Japan, followed by low paid or part-time work after retirement. Large 
wage reductions for older female job changers are much less frequent. This is suggested by Abe 
et al. to result because females are less often subject to mandatory retirement. 
  Using data from 2000 through 2003, Bognanno and Delgado [2005] find much larger 
job displacement penalties in Japan than Abe et al. They also find evidence of job displacement 
penalties that are strongly age-related, suggesting severe consequences for older workers losing 
jobs in the primary sector. However, their data includes only workers successfully re-employed 
through the services of a job placement firm. Because of the specialized sample, the generality of 
their results is unknown. A study with nationally representative data is necessary to substantiate 
whether job displacement penalties have grown larger over time and whether these penalties 
have become more strongly related to age.  
  Theory offers several explanations for greater job displacement penalties for older 
workers. Four potential sources of job displacement penalties include the loss of specific human   4
capital, the loss of a superior job match, the loss of possible union or industry wage premiums, 
and the loss of seniority [Fallick 1996]. If specific human capital, job match quality and wage 
premiums are increasing in job tenure, older workers should have greater losses upon job 
displacement. Regarding specific human capital, Koike [1988] has stressed the significance of on 
the job training in Japan and Rebick [2005] notes that, in contrast to formal education, on the job 
training is harder for employees to portray for a new employer, thus making employment change 
more costly.  
  Another explanation follows Lazear’s [1979] model of delayed payment contracts. It 
offers both an explanation of the institution of mandatory retirement and of why mandatory 
retirement might be followed by large wage losses for older workers with greater tenure. 
Workers in the model are motivated by a contract that pays them below their marginal product 
early in their firm tenure and more than their marginal product later. Worker motivation derives 
from the incentive to remain with the firm in order to collect the premium at the end of the 
contract. Workers separated from their firms late in their tenure, lose the amount that they earn 
above their marginal product when they face the outside labor market. Mandatory retirement in 
the model is a device to protect the firm from employees wishing to collect wages exceeding 
their marginal products beyond the anticipated retirement date.  
  Lazear’s model may be particularly applicable in Japan for a couple of reasons. First, 
mandatory retirement is both legal and prevalent [Clark and Ogawa, 1992]. As of 2002, almost 
all firms had mandatory retirement [JILPT, 2005, p.53, Table 3-27]. Second, relative to the US 
and the OECD, firm tenure in Japan is longer [Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985], especially for men 
[Rebick]. Long tenure provides a basis from which delayed payment contracts are feasible.  
  In support of the operation of delayed payment contracts in Japan, Clark and Ogawa 
[1992] found that earnings profiles were steeper in firms with earlier ages of mandatory 
retirement. More support for the model comes from the observation that workers reemployed by 
their firm after mandatory retirement typically take wage reductions of 50-70% [Rebick]. That 
workers accept such reductions may indicate that they have little opportunity to maintain their 
prior earnings level in the outside labor market and lends credibility to the notion that they were 
receiving wages in excess of their marginal products prior to mandatory retirement. Additionally, 
Japanese firms provide workers a substantial payment upon retirement. The amount of this   5
payment is heavily reduced should separation occur for workers with little tenure, for workers 
who voluntarily quit or for workers who are dismissed.
4  
 
2. Employment Trend Survey Micro data: 1991-2005 
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has been conducting the Employment Trend Survey 
twice a year at the end of June and at the end of December since 1964. The purpose of the survey 
is to observe labor mobility between regions, industries, establishment sizes and occupations. 
The survey encompasses 14,000 establishments with five or more regular employees sampled 
from all industries except Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, domestic services, educational 
services, and services by foreign governments and international agencies.
5 Following Abe et al., 
because the labor mobility in the public sector is so different from that in private sector, public 
sector employees have been deleted from the sample analyzed. We use the Employment Trend 
Survey micro-data with the permission of the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), a 
Cabinet Office in the Japanese government. 
  An average of 83,316 newly hired workers per year were sampled in the establishments 
surveyed in the years from 1991 to 2005. Newly hired workers are separated into three 
categories: (1) school leavers (graduates in the survey year); (2) unemployed and inexperienced 
(those having been unemployed more than one year or those in their first job); (3) job changers 
(the focus of this paper). Only job changers have information collected about their previous 
employment and the wage changes resulting from job change. From the overall sample of newly 
hired workers from 1991 to 2005, totaling 1,249,735 workers, 661,560 are job changers. From 
this group, 562,844 job changers have relatively complete information. Table 1 provides sample 
means for the variables used in this analysis.  
  The survey collects categorical information in regards to wage change, age, firm size, 
educational attainment and cause of job separation. The wage change upon reemployment is 
categorized as a loss of 30% or greater (coded as -2), a loss of 10% to 30% (coded as -1), 
between a 10% loss and a 10% gain (coded as 0), a gain of 10% to 30% (coded as 1) and a gain 
of 30% or more (coded as 2). Age is provided in seven five year increments and includes those 
                                                 
4 On average, a 40-year-tenure worker can receive 27.3 times as much as 3-year-tenure worker. (Statistics and 
Information Department, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. “2003 Survey of 
Employment Management – Retirement Management 2003,” table 7. 
5 Since 2003, educational services were included in the Employment Trend Survey. However, for consistency with 
prior years,  we excluded this industry.   6
19 and under and 65 and over to form nine categories in total. Present firm size is divided into 
five categories (5-29, 30-99, 100-299, 300-999, 1000+). Previous firm size is divided into seven 
categories (public organization, 1-4, 5-29, 30-99, 100-299, 300-999, 1000+). Education is 
divided into four categories by graduation level (junior high, high school, junior college, 
university). 
  The cause of job separation is classified into one of eight categories: (1) job 
dissatisfaction; (2) bad human relations in the firm; (3) concern over the future of firm; (4) 
dissatisfaction over compensation; (5) dissatisfaction with working time and/or number of 
holidays; (6) marriage, maternity or family care; (7) mandatory retirement or dismissal; (8) other. 
We combine these categories into either voluntary or involuntary job separations. Categories 1–6 
and 8 denote job separations initiated by the workers and are deemed “voluntary.” Mandatory 
retirement and dismissals are coded as “involuntary.”
6  
  “Job displacement” in the US context has been defined as involuntary job 
separation for reasons such as mass layoffs or plant closure and excluding firings for cause 
(Kletzer 1998). Those dismissed or subject mandatory retirement in their previous job, workers 
that we classify as involuntarily separated from their jobs, do not exactly fit this definition for 
displaced workers. In these data, the various reasons for dismissal cannot be separated from one 
another. Reasons for dismissal include plant closings, layoffs and worker misconduct. We 
contend that, because Japanese labor law makes dismissals for misconduct difficult, the bulk of 
dismissals result from plant closings and layoffs due to financial difficulties faced by the firm.  
While mandatory retirement is not a feature of the US labor market, workers 
released for this reason fit within the displaced worker definition as they found re-employment 
subsequent to mandatory retirement as a condition of entering our survey data, and, hence, would 
presumably have remained in their prior job if allowed. In any case, those subject to mandatory 
retirement are not specifically coded as such and no way to precisely identify them on the basis 
of age exists because the age of mandatory retirement varied across industry and over time. 
Despite the legal invalidation of mandatory retirement prior to the age of sixty in 1994, the 
                                                 
6 These categories that define job separations in our data do not match exactly with the reasons for job separation 
listed in table 2 that come from a different source and are not tabulated from our data.   7
decline in firms with a mandatory retirement age below sixty adjusted gradually from 20% in 




Table 1 provides means for the numerous binary variables available in these data. Of job 
changers in the sample, 40% are female and 17% are subject to involuntary job change. Defining 
career change as a change of both industry and occupation, 26% of workers change careers, 
while 25% change only in industry and 7% change only in occupation. In terms of working 
hours, 12% of workers are part-time both before and after job change, 7% move from part-time 
to full-time and 7% move from full-time to part-time. While 71% of job changers move to a firm 
in a different size category, 54% move to larger firms. 
  Table 2 provides reasons for job separations by year and gender. A trend toward more 
involuntary separations for both males and females is clearly evident. Involuntary separations 
peak in the period from 1998-2002, the same period in which unemployment peaked (see table 7 
for labor market statistics). The primary source of involuntary job separation growth prior to the 
start of improvement in the labor market in 2003-04 was management convenience, akin to a 
layoff in the US. Increasing trends in temporary transfer to another company (shukko), contract 
expiration and mandatory retirement are also evident. It is interesting to note that marriage and 
childbirth are decreasing in importance as a source of job separation for females and nursing care 
is increasing. This makes sense in light of the falling rates of fertility and marriage and the 
increasing share of the elderly in the population.         
  Table 3 examines wages changes by year, age, and gender, initially pooling all sources 
of job loss and using the full sample, and then separately examines wages changes from 
involuntary job loss and temporary transfer to another company by age and gender. To 
summarize the wage changes across the five categories in table 3, we followed Abe et al. and 
assigned values of -30%, -15%, 0%, 15% and 30% respectively to the five categories to compute 
a rough mean wage change in the second to last column. While not exact as a mean wage 
                                                 
7The ratio of firms with a mandatory retirement age less than 60 according to the annual Employment 
Administration Survey (Koyo-kanri Chosa) is as follows: 36.1% in 1991; 29.2% in 1992; 23.4% in 1993; 20.0% in 
1994; 15.9% in 1995; 14.2% in 1996; 11.7% in 1997; 9.8% in 1998; 6.7% in 1999; 0.8% in 2000; 0.8% in 2001; 
1.0% in 2002. 
    8
change, it facilitates consideration of time trends, age relationships and comparisons across 
panels. 
  The first panel of table 3 displays a clear trend towards less favorable job separation 
outcomes for workers between 1991 and 2005, though there is evidence of slight improvement in 
2004-05. The fall in workers with pay increases of 10% to 30% is marked. Whereas 31% of 
workers had job change outcomes resulting in wage increases of 10% to 30% in 1991, this fell to 
12% by 2003 and then improved to 14% by 2005. Most of the decline in this category’s share 
showed up as an increase among those with more neutral wages changes of between -10% to 
+10% and, to a lesser extent, as an increase among those with wage losses over 30%. Wage 
changes between -10% to +10% increased in share from 46% to 61% between 1991 and 2005. 
During the same period, those with wage losses over 30% increased in share from 5% to 8.4%. 
The increasing wage penalties depicted in table 3 coincided with unemployment rates that rose 
from 2.1% in 1991 to 5.4% in 2002 and then receded to 4.4% by 2005 (see table 7).  
  The second, third and fourth panels of table 3 clearly show that older workers face 
larger job change costs, but more so for males than for females. Large negative wage changes are 
more likely for young females than young males and older males than older females. The 
potential impact of mandatory retirement for older workers appears significant for both genders 
but more so for males. Restricting the sample to involuntary job separations results in larger job 
change costs for both genders but more so for males. Panels 5 and 7 show large percentages of 
males and females from 60-64 who suffer wage decreases of 30% or more. Of males in this age 
group who undergo involuntary change, 53% lose 30% or more in wages, the corresponding 
figures for females is 24%.  
  Temporary transfer to another company (shukko), displayed in panels 6 and 8 of table 
3, have implications for wage changes overall that are similar to job changes from all sources in 
the full sample but some differences should be noted. There is much greater wage stability for 
workers undergoing shukko than is present for workers in the full sample in panels 3 and 4. 
Correspondingly, there is a reduction in the advantage of young workers over older workers that 
was clearly displayed in the full sample. However, even with temporary transfers, it is still the 
case that male workers over 55 are more likely to suffer significant wage reductions.       
 
   9
3. Factors Influencing Job Change Costs: Empirical Estimates     
3.1 Econometric Model 
The dependent variable in this study, wage change, is an ordered, discrete variable and a 
technique that recognizes both of these characteristics is necessary. We define yi to represent the 
observed percentage change in the wage for worker i and estimate an ordered logit model.  
         ⎧-2   if  %∆w ≤ -30% 
            ⎪-1   if -30% < %∆w ≤ -10% 
(1)                   yi  =  ⎨  0  if -10% < %∆w ≤ 10% 
            ⎪  1  if 10% < %∆w ≤ 30% 
            ⎩  2  if 30% < %∆w  
 
Presented as a latent variable model and defining y* as a latent variable, the model is then  
 
(2)   y i* = xiβ + εi       
 
(3)   y i = m if τm+2 ≤ yi* < τm+3 for m = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2.  
 
where yi* denotes the unobserved percentage change in the wage for individual i, x is a vector of 
indicator variables for worker characteristics and the characteristics of the worker’s initial and 
subsequent firms and ε is a random error term assumed to have a logistic distribution. The 
observable yi occurs in five ordinal categories (m) with cut points from τ0 to τ5, assuming τ0 = -∞ 
and τ5 = +∞. With a normalization of τ1 = 0, the following probabilities result: 
P(yi = -2⎪xi) = exp(-xiβ)/[1 + exp(-xiβ)] 
P(yi = -1⎪xi) = exp(τ2 - xiβ)/[1 + exp(τ2 - xiβ)] - exp(τ1 - xiβ)/[1 + exp(τ1 - xiβ)] 
P(yi =  0⎪xi) = exp(τ3 - xiβ)/[1 + exp(τ3 - xiβ)] - exp(τ2 - xiβ)/[1 + exp(τ2 - xiβ)] 
P(yi =  1⎪xi) = exp(τ4 - xiβ)/[1 + exp(τ4 - xiβ)] - exp(τ3 - xiβ)/[1 + exp(τ3 - xiβ)] 
P(yi =  2⎪xi) = 1/[1 + exp(τ4 - xiβ)] 
  The results of the ordered logit estimations are presented in tables 4 and 5. The 
specifications in tables 4 and 5 estimate the effects of individual characteristics (age, gender and 
education level), whether the termination was involuntary, and job characteristics in both the 
present and previous job (part-time status, firm size, industry and occupation) on job 
displacement penalties. The coefficient estimates may be interpreted as the marginal effect on the 
latent variable y*. A positive coefficient in table 4 or 5 indicates an increase in the variable 
results in an increase the probability of a wage gain of 30% or more and decrease the probability   10
of a wage loss of 30% or more. The direction of change for the interior wage change categories 
requires the computation of the marginal effects. Marginal effects are provided for one pooled 
estimation in table 5 but not for all of the estimations in tables 4 and 5.     
  The estimations in table 4 are performed separately for each year in all but the last 
column that pools the data. Its purpose is to document basic static results regarding the effects of 
age, gender, education, firm size, industry and occupation. Table 5 estimates are based on data 
pooled across the years 1991 to 2005. Table 5 focuses on key variables interacted with year 
dummy variables, the effect of changes in firm size, industry, occupation, career and 
employment status and differences that result when the sample is divided by age, particularly in 
regards to gender. To allow time trends to be clearly identified, the last column of table 5 uses 
interactions with a year trend variable in place of interactions with individual year dummy 
variables. Table 5A presents the marginal effects associated with the last column of table 5.   
    
3.2 Basic Results  
The results in table 4 suggest that in any given year, older workers suffer larger job change 
penalties than younger workers. This owes to the negative sign on age squared. No clear sign 
pattern emerges with respect to gender in table 4 and parameter estimates are insignificant in 
most years. The influence of gender on job change penalties receives more attention in table 5.  
  Workers with more education tend to have larger job change penalties relative to those 
with a junior high education. However, this pattern is not orderly as junior college graduates 
have larger penalties than college graduates do and, later in the sample period, table 4 shows 
college graduates to have outcomes not significantly different from junior high graduates. 
Statistically significant evidence of university graduates having worse wage change outcomes 
than junior high graduates do disappears in the mid-90s.  
  In terms of present employment, the results in table 4 suggest that better outcomes exist 
for those reemployed at larger firms. Coefficient estimates are positive and significant for firms 
with more than 300 employees relative to those with fewer than 30. The coefficients are more 
than twice as large for reemployment at firms of over 1000 employees. The benefits of finding 
reemployment at a larger firm are consistent with Rebick’s finding that pay is 14% higher for 
males and 23% higher for females at firms with over 1000 employees in comparison to firms 
with 10 to 100 employees. Table 4 also implies that job loss penalties are the largest for workers   11
finding jobs in the wholesale/retail/restaurant and service industries or administration and sales 
occupations.   
  In terms of previous employment, the results in table 4 suggest that workers leaving the 
mining and finance/insurance/real estate industries or managerial occupation fare worse than 
other job changers. In terms of firm size, only leaving a large firm with employment over 1000 
carries a larger penalty than leaving a public organization. The smaller the previous firm, the 
more favorable is the wage change upon reemployment.  
  The part-time dummy is coded as a 1 when re-employment is part-time. Not 
surprisingly, those accepting part-time work have larger penalties, as do those involuntary 
separated from their previous employment. Table 4 also illustrates that workers leaving jobs that 
were previously part-time do increasingly well later in the sample. 
 
3.3 Trends, Specific Capital, Gender and Age 
Table 5 pools all of the sample years and in the center two columns provides separate estimates 
for those workers less than 35 years of age and those 35 years of age and over. We confine our 
discussion of table 5 primarily to the time trends results in columns 1 and 4, different notions of 
specific capital and the key differences between columns 2 and 3 that divide the sample by age.  
  Considering columns 1 and 4 of table 5 first, we see that the age-related job change 
penalty is increasing over time during the sample period. After controlling for age and age-
squared, the age-year interaction variables change from positive in the early sample years to 
generally negative in later years in column 1 and the age-year trend interaction variable is 
significantly negative in column 4, showing that job change penalties are increasingly age-
related. This supports the results of Bognanno and Delgado that suggested increasingly large job 
loss penalties for older workers in Japan.  
  Interestingly, a comparison of the US and Japan in table 6 shows that the countries do 
not share the same trends in job loss penalties. We report Farber’s [2003] results using the 
Displaced Worker Survey and tailor our sample and estimation to match his as closely as 
possible.
8 The base category for the US is white males from 20-24 with 12 years of education 
and less than one year of tenure. Given the base category, insignificant results for the age group 
                                                 
8 Both samples are restricted to those between 20 and 64 and undergoing full-time to full-time job transitions. Rather 
than ordered logit, our estimates in table 6 are OLS to facilitate a comparison to Farber’s estimates.     12
dummy variable of those 25-34 is not surprising. Those aged 35-44 in the US sample ending in 
1993 lose 13% in earnings relative to the base category. In the later sample years for the US, this 
age category has results that are statistically insignificant, though the coefficients become 
positive and close to significant in 2001. Similarly, for US workers aged 45-54, job change 
penalties are significantly greater in the 1993 and 1995 samples but lose significance thereafter. 
For US workers aged 55-64, significantly negative effects are only evidenced in 1993 and 1995. 
They become insignificant and positive by 2001. There is no evidence of increasingly age-related 
job change penalties in the US, rather age-related penalties appear to decrease.      
  The base category for Japan is males from 20-24 with 12 years of education. Just as 
with the US, the dummy variable estimates for Japanese males 25-34 are insignificant. For all of 
the older age categories in Japan, workers have larger wage losses than those 20-24.
9 Moreover, 
an increasing trend in the job loss penalty for the oldest workers is evident. The job change 
penalty grows from 12.2% for workers 55-64 in 1993 relative to the base category to 15.5% by 
2001. This contrasts with the US where workers 55-64 lost an additional 22.2% in earnings in 
1993 relative to the base category but had no significant difference beginning in 1997 and 
continuing to 2001.     
  Table 5A reports the marginal effects corresponding to pooled estimates in column 4 of 
table 5. The interpretation of most of the marginal effects is straightforward. In the case of the 
marginal effect of age, ignoring the year trend, there are two terms to evaluate. First, recall that 
age in these data is categorical (1:under 19, 2: 20-24, 3: 25-29, 4: 30-34, 5: 35-44, 6: 45-54, 7: 
55-59, 8: 60-64, 9: over 65) and that increasing age by one unit is a change of 5 years. To get an 
idea of the size of the effect of age on wage outcomes from job change, we consider moving 
from the sample mean in age (4.4 ≈ 32 years) to one unit higher (5.4 ≈ 37 years) and 
approximate through a linear extrapolation of the marginal effects on age and age
2. The first 
order marginal effect of age is simply -0.78% and the second order marginal effect of age is 
(0.18%)(5.4
2 – 4.4
2). Combining these two effects, we compute that the effect of ageing five 
years from the sample mean is to increase the probability of losing 30% or more in wages by 
about 1.0%. Similarly computed, it increases the probability of a wage loss of 10-30% by 1.7%, 
                                                 
9 Because we employ a categorical wage change variable, interpretation of our coefficients requires minor 
calculation. For example in the period 1992-93 for workers aged 55-64 the parameter is -0.810, assuming a 15% 
wage change between categories, the job change penalty for these workers is 12.2% (-0.801x15% ) above the base 
category.   13
a wage change of -10 to 10% by 0.2%, a wage gain of 10-30% by -2.3% and a wage gain of 30% 
or more by -0.6%. Due to the positive sign on the coefficient of age
2, the increase in the 
probability of losing 30% in wages from a unit increase in age grows larger with the starting age 
level.  
  To consider whether human capital is industry, occupation or career specific, we code 
three variables for workers changing only their industry, changing only their occupation or 
changing their career. A career change constitutes a change of both industry and occupation. The 
omitted category is workers remaining in the same industry and occupation. First, it is clear that 
workers remaining in the same industry and occupation fair better than workers changing in one 
or both dimensions. Second, penalties from changing industry or occupation still exist after 
separately accounting for career changes. In terms of the marginal effects, table 5A shows that 
the probability of losing 30% or more in wages is increased by 1.3% for industry change alone,  
2.4% for occupational change alone and 1.2% for career change. 
  Our results are not in accord with those of Munch [2006] who found support for career 
specific human capital using Danish data. The penalty for changing careers in our data is less 
than the penalty for changing only one’s industry or occupation. Occupation change carries the 
most significant penalty in the Japanese labor market. This finding is confirmed in the simple 
summary statistics in table 8 that show the largest wage declines occur after occupation change 
and a neutral effect for career change. Interestingly, though suffering the least in terms of wage 
changes, career changers had the longest average unemployment duration. The effect of 
unemployment duration on wage change is not necessarily negative since more time spent in job 
search could be beneficial to wages. Table 8 also shows the rate of involuntary quits to be lower 
among career changers, perhaps explaining part of why career changers fare better in wage 
changes. Even controlling for involuntary separation in table 5, career changers suffered less 
than occupation changers. 
  While industry change was initially disadvantageous as indicated by the negative 
dummy variable in both columns 1 and 4 of table 5, the penalty associated with these changes 
was diminishing. It disappears entirely in 2001 and industry change is actually beneficial in 
2005. Occupation change exhibits a pattern similar to industry change in that it increases wage 
losses and the losses are diminishing during the sample period. However, unlike industry change, 
the penalty from occupational change does not vanish entirely even by the end of the sample.    14
 
  There are two forces potentially related to the fall in the cost of industry change. First, 
wage differentials between industries were declining as displayed in figure 3. This would at least 
reduce the cost of industry change for those leaving jobs in higher paid industries. Second, 
regarding the falling cost of both industry and occupation change, it is possible that industry-
specific and occupation-specific human capital diminished in importance due to falling training 
expenditures at the firm level that took place during the 1990s (see footnote 1).  
  Table 5A shows the marginal effects of changing firm size. The probability of losing 
30% or more in wages is increased 3.5% by moving to a smaller new firm and diminished by 
2.1% for moving to a new larger firm. However, the firm-size change cells in columns 1 and 4 of 
table 5 shows that firm size fell in importance during the sample period. The consequences of a 
change in firm size diminished both in the rewards of moving to a larger firm and in the penalties 
of moving to a smaller firm, suggesting a diminishment of the firm-size premium.  
  Changes in employment status are considered through three dummy variables in table 
5. Workers losing full-time employment status are coded as ones for the “from full-time to part-
time” dummy variable. Workers gaining full-time employment status are coded as ones for the 
“from part-time to full-time” dummy variable. Those workers who were initially employed part-
time and remained part-time in subsequent employment are coded as ones for the “continuously 
part-time” dummy variable. The status omitted from this coding scheme represents those who 
retain full-time employment status through their job change. Naturally, the penalty from leaving 
full-time employment status is large. In table 5A, we see that the probability of a 30% wage drop 
increases by 22% for workers moving from full-time to part-time jobs. However, there is a weak 
positive trend diminishing this penalty. The substantial gain in moving from part-time to full-
time employment grows slightly larger during the period. Those remaining in part-time status 
through job change have increasingly positive outcomes in wage changes.   
  The year dummy variables in the last panel of table 5 illustrate the rising overall job 
change costs during the sample. This rise is largely attributable to the increasingly negative 
effects on those 35 years of age and older. The slight reversal in overall penalties in column 1 in 
2004-05 appears driven by better outcomes for workers under 35.   
  In columns 2 and 3 of table 5 that divide the sample by age, we consider the effects of 
gender, involuntary job change and changes in industry, occupation and career. In general,   15
gender exerts more influence on wages in Japan than in other developed countries [Tachibanaki 
1998] and the median weekly earnings ratio of female to male earnings in Japan (.64) is 
substantially lower than the OECD average (.78) or the US average (.76) [Blau and Kahn, 2000, 
p.92, table 3]. Although women earn less on average in Japan, they do not suffer more from job 
change. Overall, in these data, females in the pooled estimations in columns 1 and 4 have better 
outcomes than males in terms of the percentage wage change.  
  Columns 2 and 3 indicate that, while females under 35 have less favorable wage 
changes than males, females over 35 have more favorable wage changes than males. This pattern 
makes sense if male workers are more likely to be on delayed payment contracts than female 
workers are. Young female workers, earning close to their marginal product, may be harmed 
more by job loss relative to young males if males had accepted underpayment initially as part of 
a delayed payment contract. Older females fare better because older males are losing the 
premium paid towards the end of the delayed payment contract. This notion of a difference 
between males and females in terms of delayed payment contracts is supported by the fact that 
the influence of gender on pay grows with age in Japan. The earnings of full-time females aged 
20-24 relative to males is .89, this drops to .60 for those aged 40-44 [Rebick]. There are other 
explanations for our finding besides males being on delayed payment contracts. If men receive 
more firm-specific training, it is possible that older males fare worse relative to females than 
younger males because of a greater loss of firm-specific capital. 
  Involuntary job change harms older workers more than younger workers. Columns 2 
and 3 show that the coefficient on involuntary job change is substantially larger in absolute value 
for older workers than their younger counterparts. The greater cost imposed on older workers in 
terms of wage change would to some extent mitigated by a larger severance payment upon job 
separation.   
  Not surprisingly, as illustrated by the industry change dummy variable in columns 2 
and 3, older workers finding reemployment in a different industry are harmed, while industry 
change has little discernable effect on the wage change of younger workers. This is reasonable 
since older workers lose more industry specific human capital than younger workers. The same 
pattern appears for occupation changes and career changes, though occupation changes do 
impose a penalty on younger workers.   
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3.5 Discussion  
The analysis to this point raises two important questions. First, why are job change penalties 
becoming more age-related? Second, why are job change penalties growing? These questions are 
related in the sense that growing job change penalties for older workers during the period are 
contributing to, but do not fully explain, the growth in overall job change penalties.  
  Figure 1 is insightful in depicting the changing consequences of job loss for older 
workers. The figure plots age-wage profiles for newly hired workers and career workers who 
have all of their labor market experience within the same firm. These profiles are generated from 
estimations on cross-sectional micro data from 1993 and 2003 for regular workers in the private 
sector.
10 The age-wage profiles for career workers are virtually identical in 1993 and 2003 and 
diverge with age from the profiles of newly hired workers. The disparity in wages between 
career workers and the newly hired workers grows strongly with age. This is consistent with our 
estimates pointing to job loss penalties that increase with age. 
   While the profiles for career workers in 1993 and 2003 are similar, the slope of the 
wage profile for newly hired workers in 2003 fell significantly from the wage profile in 1993. As 
a result, the penalty for older job changers was increasing. This is also consistent with our 
finding in table 5 of an increasingly negative outcome for older workers during the sample 
period.    
  We can only speculate as to why older job changers were treated increasingly less 
favorably in the labor market. It may be that prior to Japan’s long recession, firms could afford to 
honor the delayed payment contracts entered into by older workers at their prior firms. This is 
not profit-maximizing behavior on the part of the individual firm. We are suggesting firms held 
to a social contract and paid older newly hired workers above their marginal product, despite it 
being the previous employer who benefited from the underpayment earlier in the worker’s 
career.  
  A second potential explanation is that technological change induced a loss of human 
capital for older workers relative to younger workers between 1993 and 2003. The effects of a 
loss in human capital for older workers would be felt by those changing jobs. Implicit contracts 
                                                 
10 Kawaguchi and Kambayashi [2007] report these estimations from their analysis of the Basic Survey of Wage 
Structure. The estimations included controls for gender, educational level, age, age
2, firm size, industry and 
prefecture. The effect of age on wages is calculated and then standardized so that an 18-year-old worker has wages 
equal to one in each of the profiles. Career workers are those with firm tenure equal to their age minus the years 
required to attain their educational level.   17
would protect workers remaining in continuous employment. This explanation is consistent with 
wage profiles remaining the same for career workers but falling in slope for the newly hired 
workers in 2003. However, if the technological change was global, we are at a loss to explain 
why job change penalties were not also increasing in the US.   
  To explain the increasing trend in job displacement penalties remaining after 
accounting for the increasing penalties on older workers, we first examine the trends in basic 
labor market conditions. Figure 2 displays Japanese turnover rates. In the period from 1974 to 
2005, the gross turnover rate fluctuates between 25 and 35% with no trend during the period.
11 
Similarly, the inflow rate of job changers in the labor market fluctuates between 5 and 10% with 
no trend.
12 The increasing trend in overall job displacement penalties cannot be related to 
turnover rates in any readily apparent way.  
  Another avenue for investigation concerns the potential loss of specific capital. Did a 
larger percentage of workers lose specific capital during the sample period due to industry 
change? Table 7 shows that over the sample period there was very little change in the percentage 
of workers finding reemployment in the same industry and occupation. The percentage of 
workers changing industry fell by 0.3% between 1991 and 2005. In the same period, occupation 
changes increased 1.1%. These small changes were offset by a fall in career changes of 4.5%. 
The net effect is that 3.8% more workers undergoing job change remained in the same industry 
and occupation. There is no support for the argument that an increase in the percentage of job 
changers losing specific capital explains the increase in job displacement penalties.     
  If the about same percentage of workers remained in their industry and occupation 
through job change, was it the case that the penalties associated with industry change grew? 
Figure 3 displays two points. First, industry change penalties actually fell during the sample 
period. Second, wage differentials between industries were falling. Hence, increasing job 
displacement penalties do not appear to be driven by increasing penalties for changing industry. 
This point was also evident in table 5. Table 5 showed that the costs of changing industry and 
occupation diminished, as did the cost of going to a smaller firm upon reemployment.     
                                                 
11 The gross turnover rate is the number of workers leaving employment and the number of workers entering 
employment divided by the total number of workers in the beginning of the year. 
12 The inflow rate of job changers is the number of workers entering employment from previous employment with 
unemployment duration of less than a year divided by the number of workers at the beginning of the year.   18
  The only labor market conditions that we can point to in suggesting a reason for the 
increasing job change penalties is the rising unemployment rate and the slight increase in the 
percentage of involuntary job changes displayed in table 7.  
  
4. Conclusion 
Few studies of job displacement in the Japanese labor market appear in the literature. This is 
largely due to the difficulty of obtaining worker level data. We study a large national sample of 
workers to document basic trends regarding the wage implications of job change. In doing so, we 
uncover both anticipated and novel results.  
  Because of a worsening in the labor market conditions during the period studied, at 
least in terms of the unemployment rate, it is not surprising that workers changing jobs had 
increasingly less favorable outcomes between 1991 and 2005. Given the strong returns to 
seniority in Japan, it was also not surprising that older workers had larger job displacement 
penalties than younger workers. As well, the costs of changing industry, occupation and 
involuntary job separation were larger for older workers. 
  Other findings point to more nuanced changes taking place within the Japanese labor 
market in regards to the value assigned to workers changing jobs. Education does not provide a 
buffer against the cost of job change in Japan. The percentage wage losses of high school and 
junior college graduates exceeded those of junior high graduates. College graduates did not 
suffer larger losses later in the sample period but also were not significantly shielded from the 
costs of job change.  
  It is interesting to note that hidden in the small gender differences in job change 
penalties overall were larger penalties for young females in comparison with males and smaller 
penalties for older females. While the gender wage gap for younger females is smaller than for 
older females, younger females suffer comparatively more from job change. A potential 
explanation is that male workers accept delayed payment contracts that result in reduced job loss 
penalties for the young and larger penalties for the old.  
  The diminishing firm size wage premium suggests that the wage structures of larger 
and smaller firms may be gradually converging at least for newly hired workers. Falling industry 
and occupation change penalties could be the result of less specific human capital, perhaps 
reflecting a gradual decline in firm training expenditures. Career change carried a smaller cost   19
than industry or occupation change alone, even with the longer unemployment spells associated 
with it. We find no evidence that human capital is more career specific than specific to 
occupation or industry as has been suggested recently in the literature. 
  The extent to which older workers suffered reduced wages from job change grew 
during the sample period. Correspondingly, there was a reduction in the return to age for those 
finding new employment in the Japanese labor market. We offered two hypotheses for these 
findings. First, the reluctance of firms to honor the delayed payment contracts that workers had 
entered into with their previous employers may have been increasing. Second, technological 
change may have eroded the human capital of older workers. The effects of this would be felt by 
the older workers needing to find new employment since continuously employed workers are 
shielded by the implicit contracts operating within the firm. Both of these hypotheses merit 
further investigation as we can say nothing conclusively about why older workers are receiving a 
lower return on their experience.    20
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 Variable N Mean
Wage change 562844 -0.013 -2: -30%, -1: -10%, 0: 0%, 1: +10%, 2: +30%
Age 562844 4.389 1:under 19, 2: 20-24, 3: 25-29, 4: 30-34, 5: 35-44, 6: 45-54, 7: 55-59, 8: 60-64, 9: over 65
Female 562844 0.395 1=female, 0=male
Junior high 562844 0.118 1=junior high, 0=other
High school 562844 0.527 1=high school, 0=other
Junior college 562844 0.155 1=junior college, 0=other
University 562844 0.200 1=university, 0=other
Involuntary quit 562844 0.169 1=if reason of quit is mandatory retirement, dismissal or end of contract, 0=other.
Mining 562844 0.011 1=mining, 0=other
Construction 562844 0.045 1=construction, 0=other
Manufacturing 562844 0.475 1=manufacturing, 0=other
Electricity/ gas 562844 0.010 1=electricity/ gas, 0=other
Communication/ transportation 562844 0.058 1=communication/ transportation, 0=other
Wholesale/ retail/ restaurants 562844 0.061 1=wholesale/ retail/ restaurants, 0=other
Finance/ insurance 562844 0.024 1=finance/ insurance, 0=other
Real estate 562844 0.023 1=real estate, 0=other
Service 562844 0.293 1=service, 0=other
Agriculture 562036 0.007 1=agriculture, 0=other
Mining 562036 0.005 1=mining, 0=other
Construction 562036 0.069 1=construction, 0=other
Manufacturing 562036 0.333 1=manufacturing, 0=other
Communication/ transportation 562036 0.071 1=communication/ transportation, 0=other
Wholesale/ retail/ restaurants 562036 0.106 1=wholesale/ retail/ restaurants, 0=other
Finance/ insurance 562036 0.047 1=finance/ insurance, 0=other
Service 562036 0.236 1=service, 0=other
Other 562036 0.126 Other
Only industry change dummy 562,036 0.250 1=change of industry & same occupation, 0=other
Technician 562844 0.143 1=technician, 0=other
Manager 562844 0.054 1=manager, 0=other
Administration 562844 0.174 1=administration, 0=other
Sales 562844 0.063 1=sales, 0=other
Service 562844 0.120 1=service, 0=other
Communication/transportation 562844 0.042 1=communication/transportation, 0=other
Production 562844 0.322 1=production, 0=other
Others 562844 0.083 1=other, 0=occupation listed above
Technician 562751 0.148 1=technician, 0=other
Manager 562751 0.064 1=manager, 0=other
Administration 562751 0.158 1=administration, 0=other
Sales 562751 0.100 1=sales, 0=other
Service 562751 0.144 1=service, 0=other
Communication/transportation 562751 0.043 1=communication/transportation, 0=other
Production 562751 0.256 1=production, 0=other
Other 562751 0.086 1=other, 0=occupation listed above
Only Occupational change dummy 562036 0.074 1=change of occupation & same industry, 0=other
Career change dummy 562036 0.260 1=change of industry & occupation, 0=other
Present part time dummy 562844 0.186 1=part time, 0=full time
Previous part time dummy 562844 0.190 1=part time, 0=full time
continuing part time 562844 0.120 1=changed, 0=others
from part time to full time 562844 0.070 1=changed, 0=others
from full time to part time 562844 0.067 1=changed, 0=others
5 - 29 562844 0.062 1=employment of 5 - 29, 0=other
30 - 99 562844 0.178 1=employment of 30 - 99, 0=other
100 - 299 562844 0.224 1=employment of 100 - 299, 0=other
300 - 999 562844 0.206 1=employment of 300 - 999, 0=other
over 1000 562844 0.328 1=employment of over 1000, 0=other
Public organization 560527 0.023 1=public organization, 0=other
1 - 4 560527 0.026 1=employment of 1 - 4, 0=other
5 - 29 560527 0.213 1=employment of 5 - 29, 0=other
30 - 99 560527 0.233 1=employment of 30 - 99, 0=other
100 - 299 560527 0.187 1=employment of 100 - 299, 0=other
300 - 999 560527 0.123 1=employment of 300 - 999, 0=other
over 1000 560527 0.195 1=employment of over 1000, 0=other
560527 0.709 1=up or down, 0=invariant
up 560527 0.539 1=up, 0=down or invariant
down 560527 0.170 1=down, 0=up or invariant
1991 562844 0.081 1=1991, 0=other 
1992 562844 0.069 1=1992, 0=other 
1993 562844 0.056 1=1993, 0=other 
1994 562844 0.053 1=1994, 0=other 
1995 562844 0.060 1=1995, 0=other 
1996 562844 0.068 1=1996, 0=other 
1997 562844 0.075 1=1997, 0=other 
1998 562844 0.065 1=1998, 0=other 
1999 562844 0.059 1=1999, 0=other 
2000 562844 0.068 1=2000, 0=other 
2001 562844 0.069 1=2001, 0=other 
2002 562844 0.064 1=2002, 0=other 
2003 562844 0.071 1=2003, 0=other 
2004 562844 0.069 1=2004, 0=other 
2005 562844 0.073 1=2005, 0=other 
























































































































































































22Table 2: Reasons for Job Separations (%) 
Total 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Shukko  assignments 1.8 1.8 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.2 2.7 2.8
Contract finished (1) 8.2 8.6 9.0 8.4 10.1 10.4 10.7 12.3 10.7 10.5 10.2 11.9 10.5 13.1 11.4
Management convenience (2) 4.5 5.2 7.0 7.5 8.7 6.9 7.4 10.0 11.1 9.3 12.0 12.3 9.8 8.1 6.9
Mandatory retirement (3) 3.3 4.2 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.8 5.4 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.9 4.9 4.5
Firing (4) 3.3 2.9 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.5 5.7 5.5 6.3 4.4 3.8 2.9 2.1 1.3
Death or injury (5) 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.9
Total involuntary (1)-(5) 21.4 23.0 28.3 28.6 31.7 29.9 31.2 35.4 34.2 33.0 33.6 35.1 30.9 29.6 26.0
Marriage (7) 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.6 4.3 4.5 3.6 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.2
Childbirth (8) 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.0
Nursing care (9) n.a. n.a. 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.0
Total voluntary (7)-(9)+other 78.8 77.0 71.6 71.5 68.2 70.1 68.7 64.5 65.8 67.0 66.3 65.0 69.3 70.4 74.0
Male 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Shukko  assignments 3.1 3.3 4.3 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.3 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.5 4.3 4.6
Contract finished (1) 10.3 10.7 10.7 9.4 11.6 11.8 13.1 13.9 13.3 10.6 10.0 12.3 11.1 11.4 9.2
Management convenience (2) 6.2 7.1 9.1 9.2 11.3 8.9 10.3 13.4 14.6 12.2 16.1 16.8 13.8 11.4 9.2
Mandatory retirement (3) 5.4 7.1 7.0 8.2 7.8 8.9 8.3 7.6 7.6 7.7 8.0 8.1 8.5 7.1 6.6
Firing (4) 4.0 3.7 5.6 6.4 6.5 5.6 6.1 5.8 6.3 7.4 5.0 4.5 3.7 2.6 1.8
Death or injury (5) 2.3 2.6 3.4 2.9 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.8
Total involuntary (1)-(5) 28.2 31.2 35.8 36.1 40.4 37.5 40.2 43.4 43.9 39.9 41.3 43.2 39.2 34.3 28.6
Marriage (7) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Childbirth (8) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0      - 0.0 0.0
Nursing care (9) n.a. n.a. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Total voluntary (7)-(9)+other 71.9 68.8 64.3 63.9 59.6 62.5 59.9 56.7 56.1 60.1 58.7 56.7 60.8 63.2 69.2
Female 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Shukko  assignments 0.5 0.4 1.1 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2
Contract finished (1) 6.1 6.6 7.3 7.5 8.6 8.8 8.0 10.7 8.1 10.5 10.4 11.4 9.9 12.2 11.4
Management convenience (2) 2.9 3.3 4.9 5.6 6.0 4.7 4.2 6.5 7.5 6.3 7.9 7.8 5.9 4.9 4.7
Mandatory retirement (3) 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.6
Firing (4) 2.6 2.2 4.3 2.7 3.5 3.8 4.9 5.7 4.6 5.2 3.7 3.1 2.1 1.6 0.8
Death or injury (5) 1.9 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.0 2.0
Total involuntary (1)-(5) 14.8 15.3 20.8 20.8 22.7 21.6 21.3 27.3 24.3 26.0 25.9 26.8 22.7 22.6 21.5
Marriage (7) 8.2 8.6 8.6 9.2 8.7 9.3 7.3 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.1 4.6 4.2
Childbirth (8) 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.2 5.5 4.5 5.3 4.5 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.9
Nursing care (9) n.a. n.a. 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.9 1.2 1.8
Total voluntary (7)-(9)+other 85.3 84.6 79.2 79.2 77.4 78.4 78.7 72.6 75.7 74.0 74.0 73.2 77.4 77.4 78.6
Notes: This table replicates one in Abe et al. (2002) computed with 1995 data. Shukko  refers to temporary
transfer to another company. This information comes from public sources & was not computed with our microdata.
Source: http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/kouhyo/data-rou14/jikei/kd-jikeiretu-13.xls
23Table 3: Wage changes (∆) by Year, Age and Gender
Full Sample by Year (1)
Year ∆<-30% -30%<∆<-10% -10%<∆<+10% 10%<∆<30% ∆>30% Mean* N
All 8.04 12.39 57.07 17.83 4.66 -0.20 562,844
1991 5.15 12.25 45.99 30.66 5.96 3.01 45,836
1992 5.75 12.96 49.90 26.59 4.80 1.76 38,815
1993 6.89 13.97 50.60 23.89 4.66 0.82 31,710
1994 7.25 14.50 52.16 21.52 4.58 0.25 29,811
1995 7.17 13.79 53.92 20.64 4.47 0.22 33,514
1996 7.66 14.25 52.02 21.32 4.75 0.19 38,270
1997 7.39 14.31 51.41 22.26 4.63 0.37 42,209
1998 7.99 10.83 65.67 11.55 3.96 -1.10 36,287
1999 9.68 12.04 62.82 11.48 3.98 -1.79 33,103
2000 8.85 10.98 62.46 13.10 4.61 -0.95 38,478
2001 9.01 10.58 64.02 12.22 4.16 -1.21 38,606
2002 10.02 11.79 62.34 11.50 4.35 -1.75 36,209
2003 10.07 11.21 62.61 11.71 4.40 -1.62 39,949
2004 9.76 11.96 60.27 13.07 4.95 -1.28 38,962
2005 8.40 11.20 61.03 14.19 5.18 -0.52 41,085
Full Sample by Age (2)
0-19 3.63 9.83 48.30 28.01 10.23 4.71 14,694
20-24 4.72 12.33 51.56 24.08 7.32 2.54 96,792
25-29 6.15 12.53 55.35 20.63 5.34 0.97 99,644
30-34 5.40 11.62 58.72 19.51 4.75 0.99 71,755
35-44 5.22 11.21 60.34 18.48 4.75 0.95 113,738
45-54 7.80 11.77 64.91 12.83 2.69 -1.37 95,763
55-59 15.11 15.12 59.46 8.71 1.60 -5.01 36,752
60-64 37.05 18.47 38.25 5.23 1.00 -12.80 27,668
65+ 16.02 14.06 61.69 7.04 1.19 -5.50 6,038
Full Sample of Males (3)
All 8.48 11.72 58.32 17.35 4.12 -0.46 340,574
0-19 3.66 8.90 47.14 28.54 11.76 5.37 8,413
20-24 3.65 10.12 50.70 26.88 8.65 4.02 49,719
25-29 3.76 10.57 56.99 23.01 5.68 2.44 59,319
30-34 3.77 10.65 61.48 20.01 4.08 1.50 46,893
35-44 4.51 10.76 65.11 16.64 2.98 0.42 64,182
45-54 8.35 11.26 67.94 10.77 1.68 -2.07 58,315
55-59 17.75 16.37 57.10 7.57 1.22 -6.28 27,038
60-64 42.52 19.33 32.80 4.46 0.89 -14.72 22,032
65+ 17.93 15.01 59.08 6.76 1.22 -6.25 4,663
Full Sample of Females (4)
All 7.37 13.42 55.16 18.56 5.48 0.20 222,270
0-19 3.60 11.07 49.85 27.30 8.18 3.81 6,281
20-24 5.85 14.67 52.46 21.12 5.90 0.98 47,073
25-29 9.67 15.42 52.94 17.12 4.84 -1.19 40,325
30-34 8.47 13.45 53.51 18.56 6.01 0.03 24,862
35-44 6.13 11.79 54.16 20.86 7.05 1.64 49,556
45-54 6.95 12.55 60.18 16.04 4.27 -0.28 37,448
55-59 7.74 11.65 66.05 11.90 2.66 -1.49 9,714
60-64 15.65 15.08 59.56 8.25 1.45 -5.28 5,636
65+ 9.53 10.84 70.55 8.00 1.09 -2.96 1,375
24Table 3 (continued)
Involuntary Male Job Change - excluding shukko (5)
Age ∆<-30% -30%<∆<-10% -10%<∆<+10% 10%<∆<30% ∆>30% Mean* N
All 25.00 18.21 47.70 7.34 1.76 -8.60 58,511
0-19 8.75 13.86 52.48 16.34 8.58 0.32 606
20-24 5.66 12.97 56.31 17.80 7.26 1.20 4,186
25-29 5.08 13.43 60.99 16.11 4.40 0.20 4,960
30-34 6.24 14.20 63.10 13.31 3.15 -1.06 4,409
35-44 7.54 16.00 64.46 10.43 1.57 -2.63 7,639
45-54 19.30 18.57 55.43 5.86 0.83 -7.45 10,590
55-59 31.60 23.36 40.97 3.53 0.54 -12.29 8,537
60-64 52.83 20.76 24.42 1.74 0.25 -18.62 14,915
65+ 22.93 17.01 55.98 3.22 0.86 -8.69 2,669
Males Temporarily Transferred to Another Company - shukko (6)
All 2.14 3.53 91.34 2.61 0.37 -0.67 59,588
0-19 0.93 3.03 90.44 4.90 0.70 0.21 429
20-24 1.20 3.46 89.73 4.93 0.68 0.06 2,657
25-29 0.85 2.47 92.20 3.39 1.09 0.21 5,873
30-34 0.93 2.64 92.94 2.94 0.54 -0.07 7,607
35-44 0.81 2.10 93.99 2.86 0.24 -0.06 15,836
45-54 1.70 3.31 92.75 2.05 0.18 -0.65 19,603
55-59 6.36 8.27 83.57 1.56 0.25 -2.84 6,919
60-64 34.21 15.06 46.97 2.95 0.82 -11.83 611
65+ 16.98 11.32 71.70 0.00 0.00 -6.79 53
Involuntary Female Job Change - excluding shukko (7)
All 8.99 14.79 62.57 10.79 2.85 -2.44 36,604
0-19 4.71 10.09 57.40 21.97 5.83 2.12 446
20-24 5.64 14.44 58.79 16.01 5.12 0.08 4,611
25-29 7.47 15.60 60.17 13.39 3.38 -1.56 5,385
30-34 8.43 15.39 59.92 12.71 3.55 -1.87 3,690
35-44 7.35 14.13 62.41 12.60 3.51 -1.38 7,855
45-54 8.32 14.10 67.96 7.82 1.80 -2.90 8,128
55-59 9.49 13.36 70.60 5.38 1.17 -3.69 3,068
60-64 24.49 19.61 51.68 3.86 0.36 -9.60 2,769
65+ 11.66 13.34 70.71 4.14 0.15 -4.83 652
Females Temporarily Transferred to Another Company - shukko (8)
All 1.07 3.52 89.91 4.28 1.22 0.16 5,234
0-19 0.00 1.20 95.18 2.41 1.20 0.54 83
20-24 0.90 3.87 88.65 5.29 1.29 0.33 775
25-29 0.52 2.52 90.72 3.56 2.69 0.81 1,153
30-34 0.90 2.25 92.33 3.49 1.01 0.22 887
35-44 0.69 3.65 90.54 4.95 0.17 0.04 1,152
45-54 1.77 5.43 87.26 4.98 0.55 -0.43 903
55-59 2.60 4.76 87.88 2.60 2.16 -0.46 231
60-64 7.32 4.88 85.37 0.00 2.44 -2.20 41
65+ 22.22 0.00 66.67 11.11 0.00 -5.00 9
*Mean ∆ is calculated by assigning values -30%, -15%, 0%, 15% & 30% to the five categories.
25Table 4: Basic Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 pooled
prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture prefecture
year
0.241 0.110 0.124 0.133 0.099 0.043 0.104 0.018 0.081 0.109 0.212 -0.022 0.200 0.137 0.153 0.144
(0.022)** (0.023)** (0.026)** (0.027)** (0.026)** (0.025) (0.024)** (0.029) (0.030)** (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.028) (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.007)**
-0.045 -0.024 -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.022 -0.031 -0.021 -0.032 -0.036 -0.045 -0.024 -0.045 -0.041 -0.043 -0.036
(0.002)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.001)**
-0.006 0.041 0.047 0.075 0.013 -0.027 -0.065 0.009 0.033 -0.090 -0.070 -0.038 0.016 -0.043 -0.062 -0.013
(0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029)** (0.028) (0.026) (0.025)** (0.029) (0.030) (0.028)** (0.028)* (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)* (0.007)
-0.133 -0.068 -0.162 -0.147 -0.184 -0.093 -0.155 -0.195 -0.124 -0.053 -0.149 -0.154 -0.183 -0.051 -0.079 -0.167
(0.026)** (0.028)* (0.032)** (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.040)** (0.041)** (0.040) (0.041)** (0.042)** (0.044)** (0.045) (0.042) (0.009)**
-0.323 -0.255 -0.337 -0.330 -0.449 -0.209 -0.282 -0.342 -0.283 -0.192 -0.318 -0.222 -0.257 -0.161 -0.183 -0.305
(0.041)** (0.046)** (0.049)** (0.052)** (0.048)** (0.042)** (0.041)** (0.049)** (0.050)** (0.048)** (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.051)** (0.051)** (0.049)** (0.012)**
-0.052 -0.094 -0.204 -0.165 -0.243 0.020 -0.055 -0.088 -0.054 0.097 -0.073 0.054 -0.046 0.044 0.025 -0.090
(0.040) (0.044)* (0.047)** (0.050)** (0.047)** (0.045) (0.043) (0.052) (0.053) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.012)**
0.023 -0.021 0.060 0.076 -0.106 0.090 0.054 0.066 -0.005 -0.006 -0.050 -0.020 -0.018 -0.129 -0.048 -0.010
(0.041) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046)* (0.045)* (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056)* (0.057) (0.012)
-0.016 -0.042 0.030 0.034 -0.057 0.042 0.032 0.079 -0.181 -0.009 -0.176 0.114 0.035 -0.117 0.087 -0.021
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.053) (0.051)** (0.049) (0.050)** (0.049)* (0.055) (0.054)* (0.055) (0.012)
0.112 0.088 0.211 0.192 0.003 0.101 0.224 0.181 0.122 0.204 -0.020 0.171 0.127 0.063 0.249 0.113
(0.041)** (0.043)* (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.047) (0.047)* (0.046)** (0.054)** (0.053)* (0.050)** (0.051) (0.051)** (0.056)* (0.055) (0.056)** (0.013)**
0.443 0.336 0.432 0.321 0.200 0.269 0.321 0.342 0.211 0.249 0.164 0.320 0.285 0.253 0.396 0.288
(0.041)** (0.043)** (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.046)** (0.046)** (0.045)** (0.053)** (0.052)** (0.049)** (0.050)** (0.050)** (0.056)** (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.012)**
-1.309 -1.571 -1.599 -1.665 -1.678 -1.516 -1.515 -1.784 -1.639 -1.518 -1.594 -1.614 -1.639 -1.546 -1.578 -1.570
(0.036)** (0.039)** (0.041)** (0.041)** (0.038)** (0.034)** (0.032)** (0.036)** (0.035)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.030)** (0.031)** (0.032)** (0.033)** (0.009)**
-0.915 -0.665 -0.591 -0.640 -0.619 -0.642 -0.639 -0.701 -0.709 -0.763 -0.571 -0.573 -0.748 -0.644 -0.606 -0.656
(0.031)** (0.034)** (0.034)** (0.035)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.034)** (0.033)** (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.035)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.008)**
-0.005 0.134 -0.282 0.556 0.129 0.193 0.283 0.031 -0.238 -0.088 -0.034 -0.016 0.008 0.177 0.004 0.087
(0.089) (0.089) (0.109)** (0.111)** (0.109) (0.104) (0.103)** (0.114) (0.135) (0.125) (0.144) (0.142) (0.140) (0.176) (0.166) (0.030)**
-0.328 -0.290 -0.635 0.127 -0.167 -0.115 -0.036 -0.239 -0.420 -0.316 -0.216 -0.069 -0.187 0.133 0.054 -0.181
(0.078)** (0.079)** (0.099)** (0.100) (0.101) (0.096) (0.097) (0.105)* (0.126)** (0.117)** (0.136) (0.134) (0.130) (0.168) (0.154) (0.027)**
-0.376 -0.461 -0.823 0.326 -0.219 -0.245 -0.245 -0.210 -0.547 -0.443 -0.499 -0.157 -0.429 -0.241 -0.105 -0.326
(0.131)** (0.121)** (0.136)** (0.143)* (0.135) (0.134) (0.149) (0.160) (0.178)** (0.177)* (0.184)** (0.164) (0.161)* (0.191) (0.180) (0.038)**
-0.140 0.024 -0.498 0.473 -0.077 -0.030 0.020 -0.007 -0.415 -0.398 -0.201 -0.066 -0.232 0.041 -0.088 -0.099
(0.093) (0.095) (0.111)** (0.115)** (0.114) (0.106) (0.107) (0.117) (0.138)** (0.128)** (0.148) (0.146) (0.141) (0.172) (0.158) (0.030)**
-0.446 -0.331 -0.815 0.056 -0.332 -0.349 -0.322 -0.435 -0.772 -0.623 -0.685 -0.294 -0.600 -0.328 -0.162 -0.434
(0.091)** (0.093)** (0.114)** (0.117) (0.116)** (0.107)** (0.108)** (0.116)** (0.135)** (0.125)** (0.143)** (0.141)* (0.136)** (0.172) (0.158) (0.030)**
-0.580 -0.482 -0.550 0.092 -0.379 0.048 -0.145 -0.184 -0.421 -0.185 -0.279 -0.209 -0.183 0.046 0.056 -0.171
(0.105)** (0.114)** (0.129)** (0.128) (0.128)** (0.117) (0.116) (0.121) (0.147)** (0.135) (0.152) (0.149) (0.149) (0.183) (0.170) (0.033)**
-0.266 -0.042 -0.582 0.313 -0.194 -0.225 -0.225 -0.357 -0.505 -0.194 -0.501 -0.130 -0.284 -0.255 0.254 -0.220
(0.101)** (0.108) (0.119)** (0.122)* (0.121) (0.114)* (0.114)* (0.126)** (0.146)** (0.132) (0.151)** (0.158) (0.155) (0.186) (0.172) (0.032)**
-0.446 -0.312 -0.604 0.125 -0.209 -0.182 -0.281 -0.410 -0.607 -0.531 -0.388 -0.292 -0.464 -0.108 -0.041 -0.319
(0.081)** (0.081)** (0.100)** (0.102) (0.103)* (0.098) (0.099)** (0.107)** (0.128)** (0.118)** (0.137)** (0.135)* (0.131)** (0.169) (0.155) (0.028)**
0.405 0.268 0.395 0.371 0.322 0.480 0.446 0.400 0.546 0.348 0.462 0.515 0.391 0.446 0.467 0.422
(0.072)** (0.079)** (0.081)** (0.085)** (0.082)** (0.073)** (0.072)** (0.081)** (0.081)** (0.076)** (0.075)** (0.073)** (0.073)** (0.072)** (0.072)** (0.019)**
-0.506 -0.612 -0.553 -0.675 -0.610 -0.574 -0.568 -0.683 -0.498 -0.463 -0.443 -0.616 -0.583 -0.495 -0.472 -0.541
(0.047)** (0.054)** (0.061)** (0.066)** (0.062)** (0.054)** (0.050)** (0.058)** (0.061)** (0.056)** (0.053)** (0.053)** (0.055)** (0.053)** (0.053)** (0.014)**
-0.330 -0.426 -0.269 -0.466 -0.416 -0.363 -0.385 -0.538 -0.387 -0.519 -0.352 -0.535 -0.538 -0.474 -0.370 -0.413
(0.059)** (0.067)** (0.074)** (0.077)** (0.072)** (0.065)** (0.063)** (0.070)** (0.072)** (0.065)** (0.067)** (0.065)** (0.065)** (0.064)** (0.064)** (0.017)**
0.195 -0.205 -0.215 -0.318 -0.436 -0.452 -0.372 -0.472 -0.414 -0.425 -0.374 -0.471 -0.552 -0.325 -0.494 -0.331
(0.076)** (0.058)** (0.063)** (0.066)** (0.062)** (0.057)** (0.054)** (0.061)** (0.063)** (0.058)** (0.057)** (0.053)** (0.057)** (0.058)** (0.059)** (0.015)**
-0.343 0.188 0.168 0.230 0.316 0.205 0.117 -0.223 -0.053 -0.071 -0.106 -0.063 -0.174 -0.249 -0.181 0.010
(0.092)** (0.081)* (0.087) (0.093)* (0.089)** (0.079)** (0.076) (0.090)* (0.096) (0.092) (0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.080)** (0.084)* (0.022)
0.010 -0.173 -0.154 -0.250 -0.304 -0.206 -0.229 -0.347 -0.410 -0.267 -0.360 -0.378 -0.392 -0.328 -0.236 -0.254
(0.052) (0.053)** (0.060)* (0.062)** (0.059)** (0.053)** (0.048)** (0.058)** (0.059)** (0.053)** (0.054)** (0.052)** (0.053)** (0.051)** (0.051)** (0.014)**
-0.085 -0.484 -0.425 -0.367 -0.500 -0.480 -0.445 -0.564 -0.539 -0.312 -0.347 -0.607 -0.641 -0.440 -0.503 -0.350
(0.045) (0.062)** (0.067)** (0.071)** (0.068)** (0.063)** (0.060)** (0.071)** (0.079)** (0.075)** (0.074)** (0.069)** (0.072)** (0.082)** (0.092)** (0.016)**





















































































































































































Estimation method Ordered logit
Data
26Table 4 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (13)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 pooled
-0.497 -0.963 -0.351 -0.443 -0.842 -0.617 0.060 -0.572 -0.848 -0.573 0.146 -0.443 -0.550 -0.936 -0.455 -0.549
(0.142)** (0.152)** (0.172)* (0.199)* (0.194)** (0.190)** (0.180) (0.210)** (0.221)** (0.215)** (0.234) (0.212)* (0.219)* (0.252)** (0.242) (0.049)**
-0.167 -0.617 -0.506 -0.520 -0.389 -0.438 -0.036 -0.600 -0.595 -0.574 -0.365 -0.554 -0.309 -0.769 -0.477 -0.442
(0.094) (0.111)** (0.116)** (0.127)** (0.139)** (0.132)** (0.131) (0.137)** (0.145)** (0.143)** (0.157)* (0.153)** (0.156)* (0.137)** (0.148)** (0.033)**
-0.053 -0.383 -0.429 -0.324 -0.454 -0.293 0.166 -0.475 -0.519 -0.558 -0.438 -0.624 -0.381 -0.733 -0.471 -0.385
(0.089) (0.105)** (0.110)** (0.121)** (0.135)** (0.128)* (0.127) (0.132)** (0.141)** (0.138)** (0.153)** (0.149)** (0.151)* (0.132)** (0.142)** (0.032)**
-0.111 -0.519 -0.360 -0.563 -0.459 -0.444 0.106 -0.416 -0.586 -0.421 -0.318 -0.535 -0.282 -0.748 -0.394 -0.398
(0.102) (0.118)** (0.124)** (0.136)** (0.146)** (0.137)** (0.136) (0.142)** (0.151)** (0.148)** (0.163) (0.158)** (0.160) (0.137)** (0.147)** (0.034)**
0.058 -0.377 -0.314 -0.324 -0.376 -0.253 0.229 -0.432 -0.492 -0.427 -0.327 -0.536 -0.177 -0.513 -0.311 -0.263
(0.094) (0.110)** (0.115)** (0.126)* (0.139)** (0.131) (0.130) (0.135)** (0.143)** (0.140)** (0.155)* (0.151)** (0.155) (0.135)** (0.145)* (0.033)**
-0.311 -0.758 -0.716 -0.557 -0.703 -0.627 -0.058 -0.480 -0.768 -0.433 -0.509 -0.715 -0.450 -0.857 -0.566 -0.578
(0.099)** (0.115)** (0.121)** (0.135)** (0.144)** (0.136)** (0.135) (0.171)** (0.178)** (0.170)* (0.188)** (0.182)** (0.159)** (0.142)** (0.153)** (0.034)**
0.019 -0.357 -0.332 -0.312 -0.290 -0.292 0.281 -0.351 -0.377 -0.422 -0.232 -0.401 -0.190 -0.509 -0.316 -0.256
(0.092) (0.107)** (0.110)** (0.122)* (0.136)* (0.128)* (0.128)* (0.133)** (0.141)** (0.139)** (0.153) (0.150)** (0.152) (0.133)** (0.143)* (0.032)**
-0.099 -0.568 -0.492 -0.375 -0.518 -0.444 0.124 -0.425 -0.519 -0.517 -0.350 -0.466 -0.223 -0.590 -0.315 -0.397
(0.092) (0.105)** (0.108)** (0.120)** (0.134)** (0.128)** (0.128) (0.132)** (0.141)** (0.139)** (0.153)* (0.150)** (0.152) (0.135)** (0.146)* (0.032)**
-0.716 -0.610 -0.614 -0.616 -0.570 -0.713 -0.686 -0.737 -0.682 -0.619 -0.722 -0.669 -0.623 -0.617 -0.661 -0.643
(0.068)** (0.076)** (0.078)** (0.082)** (0.078)** (0.070)** (0.069)** (0.077)** (0.077)** (0.073)** (0.071)** (0.068)** (0.069)** (0.067)** (0.067)** (0.019)**
0.268 0.403 0.199 0.302 0.282 0.264 0.141 0.138 0.128 0.161 0.191 0.217 0.250 0.338 0.362 0.258
(0.048)** (0.055)** (0.060)** (0.065)** (0.061)** (0.054)** (0.050)** (0.058)* (0.060)* (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.054)** (0.056)** (0.054)** (0.054)** (0.014)**
0.220 0.370 0.203 0.430 0.323 0.243 0.185 0.294 0.339 0.388 0.269 0.343 0.398 0.280 0.225 0.293
(0.052)** (0.060)** (0.066)** (0.071)** (0.065)** (0.058)** (0.054)** (0.063)** (0.065)** (0.061)** (0.062)** (0.060)** (0.061)** (0.058)** (0.059)** (0.016)**
0.117 0.409 0.403 0.524 0.435 0.496 0.278 0.473 0.452 0.414 0.377 0.373 0.547 0.400 0.356 0.414
(0.074) (0.058)** (0.064)** (0.068)** (0.063)** (0.057)** (0.053)** (0.062)** (0.063)** (0.057)** (0.058)** (0.054)** (0.057)** (0.055)** (0.056)** (0.015)**
0.452 0.131 0.008 0.208 0.143 0.287 0.098 0.171 0.478 0.266 0.290 0.171 0.331 0.410 0.336 0.233
(0.101)** (0.085) (0.092) (0.098)* (0.094) (0.082)** (0.077) (0.092) (0.096)** (0.090)** (0.095)** (0.091)** (0.093)** (0.081)** (0.083)** (0.022)**
0.329 0.440 0.347 0.485 0.463 0.406 0.363 0.444 0.549 0.446 0.388 0.480 0.518 0.434 0.470 0.438
(0.051)** (0.054)** (0.060)** (0.063)** (0.059)** (0.053)** (0.049)** (0.059)** (0.060)** (0.055)** (0.056)** (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.052)** (0.052)** (0.014)**
0.277 0.513 0.402 0.520 0.458 0.385 0.335 0.335 0.468 0.433 0.391 0.348 0.382 0.350 0.152 0.413
(0.044)** (0.061)** (0.066)** (0.070)** (0.067)** (0.061)** (0.057)** (0.068)** (0.074)** (0.069)** (0.069)** (0.067)** (0.067)** (0.065)** (0.074)* (0.016)**
0.895 1.077 0.885 0.823 0.599 0.746 0.751 0.778 0.712 0.505 0.866 0.993 0.946 0.837 0.820 0.805
(0.085)** (0.094)** (0.106)** (0.112)** (0.108)** (0.093)** (0.090)** (0.107)** (0.109)** (0.103)** (0.106)** (0.107)** (0.102)** (0.101)** (0.104)** (0.026)**
0.667 0.789 0.703 0.596 0.647 0.557 0.507 0.607 0.524 0.363 0.677 0.630 0.690 0.593 0.470 0.598
(0.069)** (0.074)** (0.084)** (0.088)** (0.086)** (0.075)** (0.072)** (0.083)** (0.086)** (0.082)** (0.082)** (0.086)** (0.079)** (0.080)** (0.081)** (0.020)**
0.502 0.662 0.513 0.431 0.465 0.381 0.361 0.473 0.384 0.187 0.532 0.555 0.637 0.426 0.357 0.460
(0.069)** (0.074)** (0.083)** (0.087)** (0.086)** (0.075)** (0.072)** (0.082)** (0.085)** (0.081)* (0.081)** (0.085)** (0.078)** (0.080)** (0.081)** (0.020)**
0.342 0.445 0.334 0.237 0.255 0.218 0.198 0.378 0.190 0.037 0.309 0.330 0.416 0.304 0.208 0.283
(0.069)** (0.074)** (0.084)** (0.088)** (0.086)** (0.075)** (0.072)** (0.082)** (0.085)* (0.082) (0.082)** (0.085)** (0.078)** (0.080)** (0.081)** (0.020)**
0.071 0.158 0.034 0.030 0.083 0.086 0.066 0.068 -0.063 -0.231 0.140 0.075 0.230 0.088 0.015 0.064
(0.071) (0.076)* (0.086) (0.090) (0.089) (0.077) (0.074) (0.084) (0.088) (0.084)** (0.083) (0.087) (0.080)** (0.082) (0.082)** (0.021)**
-0.371 -0.123 -0.165 -0.075 -0.049 -0.172 -0.258 -0.096 -0.246 -0.419 -0.130 -0.156 -0.068 -0.136 -0.230 -0.172
(0.070)** (0.075) (0.084) (0.088) (0.086) (0.075)* (0.073)** (0.082) (0.086)** (0.082)** (0.081) (0.085) (0.078) (0.080) (0.081)** (0.020)**
1.242 1.379 1.467 1.507 1.683 1.616 1.681 1.905 1.918 1.866 1.899 2.017 2.004 1.863 1.810 1.689
(0.034)** (0.037)** (0.040)** (0.040)** (0.038)** (0.034)** (0.032)** (0.036)** (0.037)** (0.033)** (0.034)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.009)**
Observations 45560 38568 31464 29616 33410 38166 42052 36070 32908 38342 38420 39931 39798 38667 40686 559783
Notes: standard errors in parentheses, *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level
Data































































































































































27Age 0.106 (0.008) ** -0.276 (0.029) ** -0.899 (0.043) ** 0.144 (0.007) **
Age*dummy 1992 0.047 (0.007) ** -0.055 (0.020) ** 0.169 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 1993 0.048 (0.008) ** -0.043 (0.022) 0.218 (0.021) **
Age*dummy 1994 0.038 (0.008) ** -0.079 (0.023) ** 0.154 (0.021) **
Age*dummy 1995 0.031 (0.008) ** -0.072 (0.022) ** 0.173 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 1996 -0.004 (0.007) -0.098 (0.021) ** 0.125 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 1997 -0.014 (0.007) -0.088 (0.020) ** 0.068 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 1998 0.028 (0.008) ** -0.123 (0.022) ** 0.195 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 1999 -0.016 (0.008) * -0.109 (0.023) ** 0.123 (0.021) **
Age*dummy 2000 -0.027 (0.008) ** -0.088 (0.021) ** 0.094 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 2001 0.002 (0.008) -0.059 (0.021) ** 0.124 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 2002 -0.026 (0.008) ** -0.121 (0.022) ** 0.123 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 2003 -0.021 (0.008) ** -0.090 (0.021) ** 0.086 (0.019) **
Age*dummy 2004 -0.061 (0.008) ** -0.136 (0.021) ** 0.063 (0.020) **
Age*dummy 2005 -0.049 (0.008) ** -0.119 (0.021) ** 0.084 (0.020) **
Age*year trend -0.0052 0.00033 **
Age
2 -0.033 (0.001) ** 0.041 (0.005) ** 0.031 (0.003) ** -0.034 (0.001) **
Female dummy 0.037 (0.007) ** -0.174 (0.009) ** 0.282 (0.011) ** 0.037 (0.007) **
High school -0.187 (0.009) ** -0.101 (0.017) ** -0.207 (0.011) ** -0.195 (0.009) **
Junior college -0.348 (0.012) ** -0.257 (0.019) ** -0.302 (0.017) ** -0.364 (0.012) **
University -0.190 (0.012) ** -0.136 (0.020) ** -0.182 (0.016) ** -0.202 (0.012) **
-0.708 (0.008) ** -0.345 (0.012) ** -0.935 (0.010) ** -0.699 (0.008) **
-0.131 (0.024) ** 0.035 (0.030) -0.353 (0.039) ** -0.211 (0.014) **
-0.109 (0.035) ** -0.094 (0.045) * -0.125 (0.055) *
-0.092 (0.037) * -0.071 (0.049) -0.117 (0.058) *
-0.099 (0.038) ** -0.120 (0.051) * -0.063 (0.058)
-0.062 (0.037) -0.015 (0.049) -0.083 (0.056)
-0.113 (0.035) ** -0.031 (0.046) -0.201 (0.055) **
-0.128 (0.034) ** -0.130 (0.044) ** -0.111 (0.054) *
-0.104 (0.036) ** -0.066 (0.047) -0.140 (0.055) *
-0.101 (0.037) ** -0.022 (0.049) -0.154 (0.056) **
-0.039 (0.035) -0.037 (0.046) -0.010 (0.055)
-0.059 (0.035) -0.014 (0.047) -0.075 (0.055)
-0.107 (0.036) ** -0.080 (0.048) -0.098 (0.055)
-0.087 (0.035) * -0.101 (0.047) * -0.014 (0.054)
-0.027 (0.035) -0.067 (0.046) 0.045 (0.055)
-0.002 (0.035) -0.074 (0.046) 0.108 (0.055)
0.000 (0.002)
-0.126 (0.024) ** -0.007 (0.031) -0.204 (0.036) ** -0.225 (0.014) **
-0.076 (0.035) * -0.103 (0.047) * -0.068 (0.053)
-0.076 (0.037) * -0.132 (0.051) * -0.068 (0.055)
-0.044 (0.038) -0.184 (0.053) ** 0.044 (0.055)
-0.009 (0.037) -0.052 (0.051) 0.010 (0.054)
-0.062 (0.035) -0.048 (0.048) -0.110 (0.052) *
-0.064 (0.034) -0.066 (0.046) -0.109 (0.051) *
0.038 (0.035) -0.001 (0.048) 0.040 (0.052)
0.048 (0.036) 0.019 (0.049) 0.038 (0.053)
0.106 (0.034) ** 0.022 (0.047) 0.147 (0.051) **
0.125 (0.034) ** 0.117 (0.047) * 0.097 (0.051)
0.096 (0.035) ** 0.011 (0.048) 0.134 (0.052) *
0.136 (0.034) ** 0.057 (0.047) 0.168 (0.050) **
0.139 (0.034) ** 0.051 (0.047) 0.165 (0.052) **






































































































































28-0.336 (0.040) ** -0.131 (0.050) ** -0.575 (0.066) ** -0.390 (0.023) **
0.003 (0.058) -0.073 (0.075) 0.099 (0.091)
-0.029 (0.062) -0.028 (0.082) -0.016 (0.096)
0.054 (0.063) -0.063 (0.085) 0.227 (0.097) *
0.013 (0.060) -0.022 (0.081) 0.121 (0.091)
0.005 (0.058) -0.031 (0.077) 0.093 (0.089)
-0.048 (0.057) -0.127 (0.074) 0.081 (0.088)
0.070 (0.058) 0.007 (0.077) 0.170 (0.090)
-0.019 (0.059) -0.091 (0.080) 0.113 (0.090)
0.112 (0.057) 0.001 (0.076) 0.284 (0.089) **
0.128 (0.056) * 0.104 (0.075) 0.210 (0.087) *
0.069 (0.056) -0.033 (0.076) 0.236 (0.087) **
0.105 (0.055) 0.020 (0.075) 0.258 (0.085) **
0.144 (0.056) * -0.019 (0.075) 0.377 (0.086) **
0.188 (0.056) ** 0.082 (0.074) 0.350 (0.085) **
0.013 (0.002) **
0.479 (0.022) ** 0.555 (0.029) ** 0.377 (0.034) ** 0.379 (0.013) **
-0.010 (0.001) **
-0.602 (0.030) ** -0.576 (0.041) ** -0.614 (0.045) ** -0.552 (0.017) **
0.016 (0.002) **
-1.729 (0.049) ** -1.709 (0.064) ** -1.641 (0.077) ** -1.951 (0.025) **
0.029 (0.003) **
1.208 (0.038) ** 1.088 (0.051) ** 1.294 (0.058) ** 1.321 (0.023) **
0.035 (0.002) **
0.096 (0.037) * -0.054 (0.066) 0.064 (0.046) -0.025 (0.020)
0.032 (0.002) **
-0.302 (0.045) ** 0.036 (0.071) -1.012 (0.130) **
-0.387 (0.048) ** -0.068 (0.077) -1.407 (0.136) **
-0.410 (0.049) ** 0.060 (0.079) -1.163 (0.137) **
-0.406 (0.047) ** -0.052 (0.077) -1.270 (0.132) **
-0.264 (0.046) ** 0.060 (0.075) -1.036 (0.131) **
-0.286 (0.044) ** -0.001 (0.071) -0.778 (0.130) **
-0.632 (0.046) ** -0.072 (0.076) -1.700 (0.131) **
-0.495 (0.048) ** -0.116 (0.080) -1.387 (0.133) **
-0.445 (0.046) ** -0.115 (0.075) -1.261 (0.130) **
-0.547 (0.046) ** -0.276 (0.077) ** -1.311 (0.128) **
-0.490 (0.047) ** -0.041 (0.078) -1.495 (0.129) **
-0.519 (0.046) ** -0.125 (0.077) -1.282 (0.125) **
-0.307 (0.046) ** 0.081 (0.076) -1.165 (0.129) **
-0.291 (0.045) ** 0.109 (0.075) -1.232 (0.126) **
-0.018 (0.002) **
Observations


































559783 281258 278525 559783
(2) (3) (4)
Under 35 35 & over Pooled































From part-time to full-time





















































     1992
     1993
     1994
     1995
     1996
     1997
     1998
     1999
The dummy variables (larger new firm, smaller new firm, etc.) in the firm size change and changes in employment status panels are interacted with year 
dummy variables but these are not reported for brevity. As well, the estimations in this table control for present firm size, present industry and present 
occupation dummy variables.
Table 5 (continued)
     2004
     2005
     trend
     2000
     2001
     2002
     2003
× trend
29-0.0078 ** -0.0129 ** -0.0017 ** 0.0178 ** 0.0047 **
0.0003 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0001 ** -0.0006 ** -0.0002 **
Age
2 0.0018 ** 0.0030 ** 0.0004 ** -0.0041 ** -0.0011 **
Female dummy -0.0020 ** -0.0033 ** -0.0005 ** 0.0045 ** 0.0012 **
High school 0.0105 ** 0.0174 ** 0.0025 ** -0.0240 ** -0.0064 **
Junior college 0.0220 ** 0.0346 ** -0.0043 ** -0.0418 ** -0.0106 **
University 0.0115 ** 0.0187 ** 0.0001 -0.0240 ** -0.0062 **
30 - 99 0.0140 ** 0.0225 ** -0.0007 ** -0.0285 ** -0.0073 **
100 - 299 0.0238 ** 0.0376 ** -0.0035 ** -0.0461 ** -0.0118 **
300 - 999 0.0226 ** 0.0358 ** -0.0034 ** -0.0438 ** -0.0112 **
over 1000 0.0220 ** 0.0354 ** -0.0002 -0.0454 ** -0.0118 **
0.0467 ** 0.0691 ** -0.0219 ** -0.0754 ** -0.0187 **
Construction -0.0031 * -0.0053 * -0.0010 0.0074 * 0.0020 *
Manufacturing 0.0077 ** 0.0128 ** 0.0016 ** -0.0175 ** -0.0046 **
Electricity/ gas 0.0242 ** 0.0370 ** -0.0088 ** -0.0420 ** -0.0104 **
Communication/transportation 0.0029 0.0048 0.0004 ** -0.0064 -0.0017
Wholesale/retail/restaurants 0.0222 ** 0.0345 ** -0.0063 ** -0.0403 ** -0.0101 **
Finance/ insurance 0.0135 ** 0.0215 ** -0.0020 * -0.0263 ** -0.0067 **
Real estate 0.0162 ** 0.0255 ** -0.0033 ** -0.0307 ** -0.0078 **
Service 0.0143 ** 0.0232 ** 0.0005 * -0.0302 ** -0.0079 **
Manager 0.0039 ** 0.0064 ** 0.0004 ** -0.0085 ** -0.0022 **
Administration 0.0193 ** 0.0306 ** -0.0026 ** -0.0377 ** -0.0096 **
Sales 0.0060 ** 0.0097 ** 0.0003 ** -0.0127 ** -0.0033 **
Service -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0014 0.0004
Communication/transportation -0.0122 ** -0.0210 ** -0.0083 ** 0.0324 ** 0.0090 **
Production -0.0040 ** -0.0067 ** -0.0011 ** 0.0093 ** 0.0025 **
Others -0.0046 ** -0.0077 ** -0.0016 ** 0.0110 ** 0.0029 **
0.0120 ** 0.0194 ** 0.0005 ** -0.0253 ** -0.0066 **
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0128 ** 0.0208 ** 0.0003 -0.0268 ** -0.0070 **
-0.0009 ** -0.0015 ** -0.0002 ** 0.0020 ** 0.0005 **
0.0245 ** 0.0378 ** -0.0076 ** -0.0437 ** -0.0109 **
-0.0007 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0001 ** 0.0015 ** 0.0004 **
-0.0208 ** -0.0342 ** -0.0034 ** 0.0462 ** 0.0122 **
0.0005 ** 0.0009 ** 0.0001 ** -0.0012 ** -0.0003 **
0.0353 ** 0.0537 ** -0.0124 ** -0.0613 ** -0.0153 **
-0.0009 ** -0.0015 ** -0.0002 ** 0.0020 ** 0.0005 **
0.2224 ** 0.1871 ** -0.2327 ** -0.1441 ** -0.0326 **
-0.0016 ** -0.0026 ** -0.0003 ** 0.0036 ** 0.0009 **
-0.0450 ** -0.0847 ** -0.1407 ** 0.1948 ** 0.0757 **
-0.0019 ** -0.0032 ** -0.0004 ** 0.0043 ** 0.0011 **
0.0014 0.0022 0.0003 -0.0030 -0.0008
-0.0018 ** -0.0029 ** -0.0004 ** 0.0040 ** 0.0011 **
trend 0.0010 ** 0.0016 ** 0.0002 ** -0.0022 ** -0.0006 **









From full-time to part-time
× trend
From part-time to full-time
Continuously part-time
× trend
-10% to +10% +10% to +30% over +30%
× trend
× trend





























































































Dummy: larger new firm







30(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1991-93 1993-95 1995-97 1997-99 1999-01 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01
0.035 0.053 0.028 0.065 0.075 0.008 -0.092 -0.006 -0.181 -0.038
(0.050) (0.042) (0.062) (0.058) (0.051) (0.036) (0.041)* (0.037) (0.035)** (0.031)
0.030 0.015 0.052 -0.019 0.011 0.227 0.268 0.193 0.249 0.160
(0.025) (0.024) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.025)** (0.021)** (0.020)**
0.084 0.028 -0.041 0.038 0.000 0.244 0.280 0.335 0.299 0.168
(0.043) (0.042) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.026)** (0.025)** (0.025)**
0.029 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.003 -0.164 -0.135 -0.065 -0.039 -0.060
(0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.037) (0.035) (0.044)** (0.047)** (0.036) (0.031) (0.027)*
0.067 -0.022 0.052 -0.018 0.019 -0.117 -0.073 -0.089 -0.023 -0.044
(0.032)* (0.030) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.033)** (0.033)* (0.029)** (0.024) (0.024)
-0.019 0.008 0.016 0.002 -0.095 -0.069 -0.016 -0.046 -0.022 -0.039
(0.043) (0.043) (0.060) (0.058) (0.051) -0.043 (0.048) (0.043) (0.038) (0.034)
-0.128 -0.080 -0.051 0.018 0.081 -0.154 -0.076 -0.137 -0.139 -0.169
(0.044)** (0.045) (0.061) (0.059) (0.053) (0.042)** (0.047) (0.044)** (0.040)** (0.037)**
-0.139 -0.095 -0.044 -0.046 -0.101 -0.357 -0.366 -0.469 -0.358 -0.491
(0.049)** (0.048)* (0.065) (0.063) (0.056) (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.041)** (0.038)** (0.034)**
-0.222 -0.150 -0.123 0.021 0.035 -0.810 -0.774 -1.015 -0.885 -1.032
(0.060)** (0.063)* (0.083) (0.077) (0.072) (0.039)** (0.044)** (0.039)** (0.037)** (0.033)**
2032 1663 1558 1492 1804 6972 7049 7163 7858 9510
0.057 0.052 0.027 0.015 0.032 0.160 0.155 0.217 0.201 0.221
Males, 20-24, 12 yrs education Base category
Data
Table 6: US/Japan Comparison
Dependent variable
 Post-displacement log weekly earnings minus pre-
displacement log weekly earnings
Wage ∆= -2(∆<-30%), -1(-30%<∆<-10%), 0(-
10%<∆<+10%), 1(10%<∆<30%), 2(∆>30%)
Estimation method OLS









Farber's U.S. estimates from DWS (weighted by CPS sampling weights)




Both samples are restricted to those between 20 and 64 and undergoing full-time to full-time job transitions. 
Note: U.S. estimates come from Farber (2003). Farber also controlled for nonwhite, for tenure of 1-3, 4-10, 11-20, over 20, 2 yrs since job loss, 3 years since job 
loss but, since we lack these variables, we do not report them for the U.S. 
R-squared
N
31Table 7: Labor Market Conditions and Characteristics of Job Changers
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Unemployment rate (%)*
Male 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.4 4.2 4.8 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.5 4.9 4.6
Female  2.2 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.7 5.1 4.9 4.4 4.2
Total  2.1 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.4
Female ratio in laborforce 40.8 40.7 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.5 40.7 40.7 40.6 40.7 40.9 40.9 41.0 41.3 41.4
Labor Market Turnover
Inflow rate of job changers (%)** 9.5 8.8 7.9 7.4 7.8 8.0 7.9 8.3 8.4 8.9 9.3 8.8 8.8 10.1 11.0
Inflow rate of new entrants (%) 7.2 7.0 6.3 5.5 5.7 5.8 6.5 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.6 6.4
Outflow rate (%) 15.2 14.6 14.0 13.8 14.3 13.8 15.2 15.1 15.0 16.0 16.9 16.6 16.1 16.0 17.5
Gross turnover rate (inflow+outfl 31.9 30.4 28.2 26.7 27.8 27.6 29.6 28.9 29.1 30.7 32.0 31.1 30.8 31.7 34.9
Characteristics of job changers
Involuntarily quits (%)*** 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.21
Mean wage change (%)**** 3.01 1.76 0.82 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.37 -1.10 -1.79 -0.95 -1.21 -1.75 -1.62 -1.28 -0.52
Mean age***** 35.3 36.6 37.2 38.0 38.2 37.4 36.8 37.6 38.1 37.7 38.1 38.3 38.5 37.7 37.7
Industry, occupation and career changes for job changers (%)
Same industry & occupation 40.8 41.8 41.4 42.7 44.2 40.5 39.1 40.7 40.7 40.6 41.5 43.6 43.1 41.5 44.6
Industry change only 25.4 23.6 24.0 24.5 22.3 24.0 25.4 25.6 26.2 26.0 26.4 25.2 25.3 25.0 25.1
Occupation change only 6.5 7.1 6.9 6.8 7.2 7.3 7.1 7.2 7.5 7.3 7.7 8.2 7.9 8.1 7.6
Career change (Ind. & occupation) 27.3 27.5 27.7 26.1 26.4 28.2 28.5 26.6 25.6 26.2 24.4 23.1 23.7 25.4 22.8
*Year Average from Labor Force Survey
**The inflow rate=(# job changers finding new employment after a jobless spell less than 1 year)/(# total workforce at year start) 
***Involuntray quits as a % of all job changers. This differs from table 2 as the % here is computed from our microdata.
****Mean calculated by assigning values -30%,-15%,0%,15% & 30% to the five wage change categories. (Reported in table 3)
*****Mean age is calculated by assigning values 19, 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, 40, 50, 57.5, 62.5, 65 to nine age categories.
32Table 8: Outcomes for Job Changers by Industry, Occupation and Career Change
Change None (%) Industry ∆ (%) Occupation  ∆ (%) Career  ∆ (%) Total (%)
Wage change (∆) consequences
∆<-30% 5.8 7.9 11.8 10.7 8.0
-30%<∆<-10% 10.2 12.5 15.3 14.9 12.4
10%<∆<+10% 64.0 58.9 51.3 45.8 57.1
10%<∆<30% 16.7 16.5 16.7 21.3 17.8
∆>30%  3.3 4.1 5.0 7.3 4.7
Mean*  0.2 -0.5 -1.8 -0.1 -0.2
N  234555 140231 41352 145898 562036
Unemployment duration
1 - 15 days 41.7 42.3 34.1 24.9 36.9
15 days - 1 month 12.1 11.4 12.7 14.8 12.6
1 - 3 months 21.2 20.2 22.1 25.6 22.1
3 - 6 months 13.1 12.7 14.5 16.3 13.9
Over 6 months 12.0 13.5 16.7 18.5 14.4
Mean** 66.7 69.4 81.1 90.0 74.5
N 238934 143111 42601 150300 574946
Involuntarily quits 19.9 16.2 16.0 13.1 16.9
N 234555 140231 41352 145898 562036
*Mean is calculated by assigning values -30%, -15%, 0%, 15% & 30% to the five wage change categories.
**Mean is calculated by assigning values 7.5, 22.5, 60, 120 & 270 days to the five unemployment duration categories.
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